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23 March 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR:	Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA:	Director of Scientific and Weapons Research Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM:	Chief, Technology Transfer Assessment Center
SUBJECT :	Soviet Acquisition of Western Technology by Major Loss Categories
1. Based of available to us, approximate prio	n our analysis of information from all sources the five major technology loss categories in rity order are:
- Soviet Acquisi	and East European Intelligence Service tions
- Illegal	Trade Acquisitions
- Legal P	urchases of Defense Applicable Equipment
- Open So	urce Publications, Mainly Government Documents
	ation of East-West S&T Exchange Programs and Activities
material, t majority, perhap significant West ted by the Sovie nical, and overt	n our analysis of this information, including here is extremely strong evidence that the vast is as much as 70 to 80 percent of the militarily ern technology acquired by the Soviets is collect intelligence services using clandestine, techmeans. This percentage is based on satisfaction
requirements. T those of proven applied directly sources of this classified or "p technical docume tions. Embargoe	Industrial Commission's (VPK) national defense he most valuable technologies to the Soviets are Western weapons or component designs that can be to Soviet weapons R&D and industrial needs. The Western technology run the gamut: government rotected; company proprietary; and open-source nts from companies and government organizade Western equipmentwhich appears to be mainly int Soviet intelligence and Ministry of Trade

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SUBJECT: Soviet Acquisition of Western Technology by Major Loss Categories

illegal procurement operations -- falls into this high-value category as well.

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3. The remaining 20-30 percent of the militarily significant technology acquisitions from the West are satisfied by official organizations such as the State Committee for Science and Technology, Academy of Sciences, and the Ministry of Trade and related international economic bodies. These acquisitions result mainly from legal purchases, open-source publications, S&T exchanges and research with the West, and overt collection by the host of Soviet Bloc visitors. Some of these activities also involve joint efforts with Soviet or East European intelligence services and the resultant acquisitions are reflected in joint satisfaction of the VPK requirements.

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4. Of the thousands of items of Western technology acquired yearly through overt collection and open sources, a relatively small percentage contains militarily significant technology and identifying and stopping its transfer presents an almost intractable problem. Moreover, it would appear that much of the academic research information would fall in this category. There are, however, a few critical exceptions: cryptographic research and research funded and directed by US Defense organizations such as DARPA's very high speed integrated circuit (VHSIC) projects.

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5. S&T exchanges and related academic research, as a whole, get more attention and raise more emotional hackles than the more serious losses from other catetories. Within the general category of academic activities, however, DoD-sponsored projects are potentially the most significant sources of future military or industrial technology and, as such, should be selectively protected from Soviet-Bloc intelligence collection. Furthermore, academic exchange activities themselves present a unique and serious security problem by permitting the Soviet intelligence service to spot potential recruitment targets and to develop intelligence information for future clandestine operations in the host country. The Technology Transfer Intelligence Committee's Subcommittee on Exchanges currently provide advice and guidance on these type of loss problems and its focus could be further sharpened to help stop such losses.

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6. From an analytical definition and delineation of the technology loss problem such as this, an appropriate national strategy could be developed to counter the Soviet threat. A plan using appropriate law enforcement, industrial security, and counterintelligence measures—both in the US and abroad—could be forged to stop the loss of these Western technologies. Such efforts would require cooperation with our NATO and COCOM allies. Stopping the loss of militarily significant technology

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through the acquisition of open source publications, legal purchases of defense applicable equipment, and overt collection and S&T exchanges in the West requires a more open and publicly visible effort by national governments and private entities responsible for these activities. The two basic efforts would probably have to be coordinated and centrally directed to be effective.	25X1
cc: Executive Director, CIA	25X1
cc. Drecutive Director, our	

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